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Ar~ersinger v . Hamlin
Cert to Fla SC: Roberts , Drew , Thorna1 , Carlton ; dissenting :

~QYQ , Ervin , Adkins

Petr was arrested and charged with a misdemeanor punishable~
under Fla law by not less thanlt three and not more than 6
l·
months or by a fine not less than $500 and not more than $1000 .
Petr pled guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of $500 , and
in default of payment to be imprisoned for 3 months .

lJe was

indigent , and therefore was ordered to prison .
With the assistance of an attorney , he filed for state
habeas corpus the day after his sentence began .

---

on bail where he remains .

He was released

His claim was that when he pled

/

guilty he was unrepresented but that he had not waived his
right to assistance of counsel .

He also claimed that he had

CCDNTROLLING CASES : GIDeon v . Wainwright , 372 U. S . 335 (1963).

- 2a defense to the charges against him ,
vote, discharged the writ ,

The Fla SC, by a 4-3

It ruled that an indigent offender

accused of a misdemeanor is entitled to court-appointed counsel
only where the offense Jmi: with which he has been charged
carries a possible penalty of more than 6 months imprisonment .
Since petr was charged with a misdemanor which was not punishable
by more than 6 months, he was not entitled to relief ,

Petr

sought cert to this Court, and the Court granted ,
This is going to be , hopefully , a brief memo , because
I do not think I can say anything here that will improve on
the amicus brief filed by the SG in this case ,

I recommend

that you read that brief and rely on it rather than the
petr's brief x as your source for that side of the case ,
The right KNXB~~NXNKRNXN~MXX of indigents to have appointed
Efg!KN XXR

Jl& was

couns 1

Wainwright ,

recognized by this Court in

~!R

Gideon v .

Although neither the reasoning nor the precise

holding of the case is limited to felonies , Gideon had been
convicted of a felony ,

It is therefore argued that the Court

has not held that indigents are entitled to appointed counsel

in mi.s:NN misdemeanor cases ,

The Fla SC and most of the persons

supporting the state ' s position , do not argue that

ax

in all

RlX.S:Na:nnRNH misdemeanor cases , there is no right to counsel .

They instead , relying on the line drawn in Duncan v . Lousiana ,
391 U. S . 145 (1968) , and baldwin v , New York , 399 U. S . 66 (1970) ,
argue that there is no such right in non- serious cases , i . e .,
cases in which the maximum~ imprisonment that can be imposed
does not exceed 6 months ,

-3In the right-to-counsel precedents, there is little
~ /4f? -~
~. I
kXE®M~ comfort forx ~!R roop'o line , K.S:XXXKHXN+XKN!RXXN In

/;t/e

the right-to-counsel area the Court has never taken an historical
approach of trying to determine wNxxxkiNx in what kinds of
cases counsel was afforded at the time the Constituti,a n was

-

----------

written.

If

\,\

It's approach has been fundamental fairness,

Very

simply put, it has held that the right to counsel goes to the
integrety of the fact-finding function, and that atria~ in
which the def end ant has been denied the right to counsel_J ~

.,u,-,r.

It has never limited this reasoning according to whether the
offense charged is serious or not.

Indeed, there is substantial

evidence for the proposition that the fact-finding process
in non-serious cases requires the assistance of counsel to the
same extent as does the fact-finding process in serious cases.
There are some interesting figures cited in the arnicus brief
of the Legal Aid Society of New York , at 16-18, which show
that rix:NxKN!RXN.s:.s:xx:kHN~Rx~f in non-serious cases in which the
society represents indigents in New York, it obtains either an .
acquital or dismissal of charges 45% of the time, whereas in
felonies, ix.s:xx!R it is successful only 9% of the time.

This

suggests that the occurance of errors is far more frequent in
rAra.~ ni "-1

the non-serious cases, and it is not xu strains judicial notice
too far, I think, to E:©NN conclude that substantially less of
these errors would have come to light had there been no assistance
of counsel.

Other studies could be, and indeed are, cited for

the proposition that the quality of justice handed out by the
lower criminal courts of this country ~~MXNX!R benefits fx@ when

- 4-

the accused is represented .

Over- burdened courts , often

presided over by judges who are poorly trained , do not aid
a def who is wi~ without assistance .

Therefore , I think it

is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that the system
works better if the accused is represented in non-serious
cases .
In addition to this due process reason in XMf~~ support
of the indir,ent's right to
equal protection ~

N~NM

counsel, there is a quasi-

- (Resp argues that this argument was

not advanced in the court below and cannot therefore be raised
1

here .

In support of this claim , ~ cites the petr's ~andid
,,
acknowledgement at p 36 of petr ' s brief . I see no such
acknowled~ement on that page .
raised below , ~

t'oreover , due process was clearly

I think that if this arguemtn is properly

classified as an equal protection argument rather than a due
process argument , that it is certainly on the hazy borderline
between those two doctrines .

Ihe Court has acknowledge that

the concept of e~Jal protection is inherent in the fundamental
fairness N~X concept of due process.)

The arguemtn is simply

that it is fundamentally MNfaxixx~ unfair to permit persons
who can afford attorneys to be represented while persons who
cannot afford them are not .

In support of this argument , petr

cites the ~riffin v . Illinois , 351 U. S . 12 (1956) , line of
cases .
Thus, petr is able to marshal two powerful constitutional
' po~

--i_e_s_ i_n__
f ...
a_v,..o.._r;....,.o:.,:f: _,:
t :,:h:.e....:
.;. r:.:i:,:g~h:.:,t,:_,:o.:f....:i:n.:.:d:.1.:· g'.:e=n~t~s~ t::,:o:.._:h::,:
a.:.v.:e:_:a:_!p~p::;o:.::
in t e d

counsel in non-serious cases .

There arc , however , counter

- 5policies .
The strongest of these is the argument that to appoint
counsel in every misdemaenor case in which an indigent is
unrepresented would be to place an insurmountable burden on
the x judicial systems.

RNx~xxxgiX~XKNRx~x~~~xixi~Nxx Resp

cites the number of traffic offenses , or charges of jaywalking
or spiiting on the sidewalk , in which counsel would have to
be afforded .

The state asserts that it would be imposiible

for all these persons to be represented .
often acquires a delicate balance

E~~

Since due process

between the rights of

the accused and the interest of the state , it is not inappropriate
.
.
to consider
these logistical
pro b lems .

~
..
t,J.groevCJ:: , t l1e 1 ogistical

argument also serves to refute the quasi-equal protection argunori-serious
ment advanced by petr .
In most/cases, the potential liability
is only a fine .

It is often not worth while for persons who can

afford one , to NXRXRxxxxa hire a lawyer; legal fees are likely
to be higher than the potential fineJ

But if an indigent has

a right to appointed counsel , we would face the anomalous situ~tion
in ~1ich all indigents would be represented because they could
most
have free assistance while/axx non-indigents would be unrepresented
because it would not be ~
attorney .

inteJligent to NiRx hire an

Furthermore , resp argues , if indigents have a right

to appointed counsel in all misdemeanor cases , why would they
not also have the same right in xi civil caseso

The potential

liability in a civil case will often exceed the maximum fine

-6 i~posable in a misdemanor case .

If assistance is provided±N in

the latter to protect the indigent ' s iNN interests , logic

- 6d ictates that assistance be provided in the former where the
same or

even greater interests are involved .

But here the

logistical problem wou1d truly prove insurmountable .

t

There is no denying the force to ~Rkx*xxaxg resp ' s logistical.

arguments , but much of that force is dissipated by the rule
suggested by the SC in his brief .

He suggests that the right

to counsel exist only in cases in which a sentence is imposed .
If at the outsetx of the process , the judge believes that
a conviction wil1 likeJy

~

a jail sentence , he must~

advise the def of his right to appointed counsel .

This is

essentially the rule proposed by the ABA , RE except that this

)

one has an ad&itional wrinkle .

The SG says that if N the

offense is one which would not normally bring a sentence
and if a judge , accordingly , does not offer an indigent appointed
counsel , he cannot then later change his mind and sentence
the man after all .
procedur~

Instead some other , as ~Ra yet unspecifie1

would have to be devised .

XNXKXXNXRXKNEKRHNkixxx~xxx

KNRXNXXXNNXKXN®WNX@NXKNRXX®5XKKXNHXX~XNMXRm

The SG ' s proposed rule would

~ ~ r y reduce the

logistical problem by eliminating crimes like jaywalking
from tho ~ in which indigents must be furnished counsel .
~N~R There is considerable~ reason to ExR± believe that the

remaining logistical problem would not be ixNNmaNgax unmanagable .
Several states have comparable rules at the present , including
New York and California .
'

While New York is not the best

example one could cite for efficiency , there is no reason to
think that the appointment of counsel in non-serious misdemeanor

- 7cases contributes substantially to the problem.

If New York

can handle the problem, it is reasonable to assume that other
states could.
the sr•s rule.

Indeed , Alaska in its amicus brief, endorses
Seconc,l, the SG says that his rule would

Qresent no insurmountable problem for the federal system .

-

~ , wh ile the SG cannot :s:10exEk speak for the a states, he
Thira
points out that the recent cases that have expanded the right
./4)-a.~

to counsel ~o R that it app_:}*s in many other stages of the
criminal process have not presented any insurmountable logistical

(

n barrier.

I'

Finally , the ABA and a federal study have concluded

that s irnilar rules are feasible .
:s:e~mXK~XNiKXRXXNXlOXXKXENXXXXXX It is reasonable to assume that
the ABA in particular was not unaware of the magnitude of
resulting logistica;ei problemso
The

t

SG's rule is also the answer to the argument of

resp that if indigents have a right to counsel in all misdemeanor
cases, they must have such a right in all civil cases.

~1 -

R~x the SG's rule distinguislhes a situation where there is a
pssibility of imprisonment from those in which the only penalty
is f±Naprn financial .

This distinguishes the ~x±ml::NiK civil cases.

Wh ile it, like all rules, is not x~~xx10exfREK perfect--there
may be some cases in which the financial interest at stake
is af higher imporaance than the possibility of a few days in
jail, although it is difficult to think of such a case involving
indigents--it does seem both workable and effective in removing
the inet!{l.lities.

As a genera l rule, the thing we think unfair

._ 8is the possibility of going to jail without having been
represented .

The magnitude of the unfairness is diminished

where the only penalty is monetary .
There is one solid workability argument advance against
the SC's position by the state of Virginia in its amicus brief .
It says that in cases where :i1iuiigHNKxx indigents are fined

\l

and cannot or will not pay the fine , they are sent to jail .
Therefore it argues that there is a possibilty of jail in almost
every case .

That is not an easy objection to answer .

of course:N; not before XNXXXE the Court in this case .

It i~
(It is

true that petr was sentenced to jail because he could not pay
a fine , but the charge involved in this case , carrying a concealed
weapon , is one that would N~xm.axjqq::xixaxx1~.nniR:. often , I a s sume ,
resu1tx in a sentence , so under the SG's rule , petr would have

- --f.evr, ~ o-/ ¼
L

~

J

Aright to appointed counsel . )

Moreover , ~

ase

presents itself , I think there is a possible avenue of distinction .
I~

that

~

jail sentences imposed in lieu of fines could

} be analagized to contempt or something 1 ike it .

Then you migh_t ,

a say that he was sent to jail not beaause he violated the

criminal statute , but because he failed to pay his fine and was
therefore in contempt .

But even if there is no distinction ,

I do not think that the p roblem is insurmountable .

\

In reality

theec are going to be very few cases in which the fine is so
large and the defendant so poorx: that he cannot pay it .

Most

of the EHX!R kinds of misdemeanors we are talking aboltlt--jaywalking

or traffic violations--do not involve fines of $500 such as was
imposed in this case .

Moreo~er , in its opinion of last term ,

lOl U .S. 395 (1971), the Court ruled that it
gal to automatically send a man to jail because he
was too poor to pay his fineo

-

It said that alternatives, such

as installment payments, had to be tried first.

Only then if

the rnan still could not or would not pay, could he be sent
Thus , in the future there should be xi&s::s:x@fx:trnx
fewer of these cases.m

So even if the rule must

r

lfi__ t h .at

1.·

f

the fine cannot be paid and the def is then sent to jail, he
had a right to counsel, the rule :s: will still clear w away a
lot of the minor cases in which jail sentences, as a prai.ctical
matter, are N!RXi&xximJO@:S:!RNX not a realistic possibility.

I

One benefit that might result from such a rule, incidentally,

is the elimination of a lot of criminal statutes ·that are not

properly criminal matters.

I do not know what one could call

them, if not crimes, blta lot of traffic ©ff!RN:S:XR offensese
E@NNX could be better handled by a

process that did not invoke

all the cumbersome mechanisms of the criminal law.

A rule

such as that suggested by the SG, might encourage states to
redefine a lot of "crimes."
Thus, I would concll.iAf that striking the logistical balance,
under the

k~.,tks-1,:t,,4 ~

s---mfggested r ~ w~

1--~

the interest of indigents

in obtaining a fair ttial, would result in a holding that
indigents have a right to N@N@N counsel in all cases in which
they are sent to jailo That is rdally th guts of this
1/4 017-f?
but there la.Fs a fsJ incidentai.1 :s- issues that need to be treated •

..fir.:,)' /.;.esp argues that~ the line for right

©K to appointed

;'•,

-10counsel xbus1N« should be drawn at offenses punishable by not
more than 6 months because that is the line drawn in the jury
cases.

The right to counsel like the right to a jury trial is

a part of the 6th Amenmento

If kNHXRxixxNNxxi~NKXRNxaxtNx~

the 6th Amen~ ent does not require a right to a jury in a case,
/I

it ought not require the H}slJslNXlnnnR appointment of counsel.
This argument assumes that the Court adopted :Mr. Justice Black's
position of total incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
the 14th Amenment.

B~t the Court did not adopt that position.

It selectively incorporated according to what it fx felt were
the dictates of fundamental fairness.

And i:x it turns out that

the reasons for incorporating some part of the 6th Amenmcnt
do not apply to others.

for example, the right to a jury trial

does not, at least to the same extent, reflect the policy
behihd the right to counsel which± is that without the assistance
of counsel, the integrety of the fact-finding process is weakened.
This is why the right to a jury trial was not made retroactice,
\ while the right to counsel was.

Thus, all the parts of the 6th'
the f ac*'E t hat
amend ment do not have the same force, so/xNaxxwNi:x!R a jury may

not be required in non-serious misdemeanor trials does not
necessarily mean that counsel. is not required.

It is very doubtful

that the Court would tolerate limiting the other rights
guaranteed by the 6th Amendment NXK~XN~NKS:i&XXNNxx«ax!R--right to
speedy trial, right to public trial, right to know nature and
cause of accusation, right to confront witnesses, right to
compel favorable witnesses--to serious offenses.

fN For one

thing, the logistical problems that are claimed to exist in

-11this case , and which certainly would exist if juries were
required in non-serious offenses , do not exist if the right
to confront witnesses , for example , is guaranteed in nonserious cases .

Thus, in the case of each right , a balance

must be struck .

In this case , as I have already argued ,

the balance should be struck in favor of the right .
(Although I promised , j o tbe paragraph bsfor"9 last , that

_.(;.:.:>....._

.,.t;hcrc were a"few" tncidental issues that needed treating ,

'<-__

I reverse myself ;;ind limit the di:3cussiot1 to the one in

,9______

th@ last paragraph , J

Q

In conc1usion , let me reiterate that ki::::s: this is really
a balancing case--the interest of the accused in counsel
vs . the interest of the state in efficieny .

I think that the

sr•s rule offers a proper method of striking that balance .

REVERSE

Fox

r•.: ,.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

March 2, 1972

Re: No. 70 -r 015

-

/

Argersinger v. Hamlin

.,

Dear Chief:
I have devoted further attention to this case.
I write this note merely to let you know that my vote,
this time around, remains just as tentative and just as
unsure as it was in December. I am particularly concerned, of course, because mine seems to be the swing
vote, and at the moment I feel I could draw the line
either at imprisonment or at the six-month mark. The
latter has the obvious advantage of relating to Baldwin.
It is possible that I shall come to rest only after something is written out.

'

'

l

Facetiously, one might conclude to send this
case back because of the Boykin error and let it go at
that.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

cc:

The Conference

...

j;u:µutttt QJomt af Urt 'Jlfuildi ~tctit.e-

'Jjla:s qiugton. l'J. QJ.

2llffeJl-.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

March 27, 1972

Re: No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin

Dear Bill:
Although your draft opinion is persuasive, I am not yet
persuaded to change my vote. Accordingly, I now plan to write
something.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Douglas
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference

lfp/ss 4/3/72 1cc

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Hamilton Fox

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: April 3, 1972

No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin
Your draft opinion of 4/1/72 is great - well written and well
reascmed.
I will, of course, do some revisions because lawyers are
incapable of accepting something another lawyer writes without changing
it. The result in this case will probably not be as good.

)..

1

<

I would appreciate your seeing whether additional facts are
available as follows:
The majority relies on a single study (as I understand it) to

,.,•:

the effect that fewer than 2300 lawyers will be needed to accommodate

' .
'

all indigent petty crime cases. You translate this into $23, 000, 000
assuming $10,000 per year. The minimum charge per hour .. prescribed

~

by any state law with which I am familiar or in any law office - is
$15. 00. If you assume 30 hours per week - which is certainly a
minimum in litigation - my arithmetic results in $22, 500 per lawyer.
If public defenders were used, perhaps you would not have to pay this

much on the average. The starting minimum wage for lawyers in

~

..

government and law firms is about $14,000 per year•
•

;"

,

2.
But I question the basis assumption that 2300 lawyers would be
adequate or that the cost would be as low as even my figures would
project.
You might do the following: (i) read, if you have not done so,
the article relied upon by the majority and see how solid it looks; (ii)
obtain the actual figures appropriated by the Congress for the OEO
Legal Services Program, going back to the first year 1965 and record
the steady increase in the requests and the appropriations - which
all of .us who worked with that program considered inadequate; (iii)
see if there are studies by NLADA as to the increase in cost on a
national basis of legal aid - both private and state provided - prior
to and since Gideon; and (iv) take a look at the briefs in No. 71-11
I

( James v. Strange). My recollection is that these briefs will reveal perhaps the record does too - that Kansas spent about $600, 000 a year
providing indigent services 1n felony cases, an amount which has been
increasing annually. The FBI shows the number of felonies in each ,
state in its annual reports. It may show the number of misdemeanors,
although I doubt this. If one compared the number of felonies committed
In Kansas, and the cost per felony for this legal service, you might
\

come up with a figure to be applied nationally. This would be w~ on
the, low side, as obviously Kansas - with few urbanized areas - is
\
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not a high crime state as compared with many others. Whether this
sort of analysis is worth the trouble is a debatable question. I
certainly would not spend any large amount of time on it. The cost
problem is not what concerns me most, but 1 am convinced that reliance
upon the single study - cited in the majority opinion - presents an

,.'•·
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..

unrealistic assessment of costs.
The consequences of the majority's position which concern me
the most are (a) the impact on the smaller communities, with all of
their diversity across the county; and (b) the impact on the criminal
justice system primarily 1n terms of aggravating the already acute
problem of "delayed justice" and intolerable cOJj-estion in court dockets
at all levels. On this latter polbl - which 1s the single most important
one in my thinking - I hope you can find some statistics which reflect
the impact of Gideon in these respects.. I retlize that statistics do not
measure any single cause of the present overburdened condition of

-,.
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the system. Decisions of this Court have certainly contributed
singificantly. But I suspect that the real "watershed" was Gideon

..

(which I firmly support), but which has created problems which the
system has not yet managed to master. As you and I have discussed
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young lawyers recieve most of the appointments (except where public
defenders are provided); they are fresh out of law school, full of the
latest constitutional ''wisdom"; they are eager to make a reputation;
they often have plenty of time; and, when paid on a hourly basis by the
state, this is lucrative and attractive work. The result is that the
simplest felony case, often without a truly substantive issue, may be
litigated all the way to the United States Supreme Court - a,t just
once but 10 or 20 times through state and federal habeas corpus.
I am sure studies are available somewhar~ possibly through
the Administrative Office of the Federal Court. I have seen references
to studies on the escalating flood of habeas corpus petitions, but this
is only a part of the story.

While the experience in felony cases is not completely analagou.s, it
is the best indication of what is likely to be the overburdening of the

••.

system ... in terms of delay frivcilous defenses, petitions and appeals.
I have one or two other ideas but we can talk about these.
L. F. P., Jr.
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Hamilton Fox

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

April 7, 1972

Re: Argersinger v. Hamlin No. 70-5015

Here is your first draft, with a certain number of suggested
changes and with a couple of fairly verbose riders.
I would appreciate your developing a secood draft, which tries
to blend together - both in substance and sty le - our respective
contributions.

Feel free, as always, to change my verbiage and

challenge my reasoning.
Specific points - some quite minor - which have occurred to
me include the following:
1. My terminology is not always consistent. I think you used
the term "petty" offenses, and I sometimes used both petty and
,.

misdemeanor offenses. Perhaps it would be well - near the outset -

J

to define petty offenses a little more specifically than you have at
present. This might be done in a footnote, which might also refer to
18 U.S. C.

§

1 defining petty offenses under federal law.

Another example of inconsistent terminology is my use of
"the majority", the "majority opinion", and the "Court's opinion".
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If there are any ground rules here as to how one should refer to the

prevailing opinion, feel free to make the necessary changes.
2. The Douglas draft makes some use of lower federal and
state court decisions. I am aware of a conflict (see ABA Standards
on "providing defense services" pp. 38 and 39 ), and wonder whether
we
have anything to gain by citing any of these cases.
I
3. &ilould we not make some reference to the fact that a number
ofistates, by statute, have extended the right to counsel into the mis1"
/

1

demeanor categories? I aave not looked at any of these statutes. I
wooder whether we could derive support from any of them for our view
that it is unnecessary to create a new, arbitrary constitutional line.
Perhaps, as a minimum, we might refer to state statutes as an example
of one way to deal with this problem without imposing on all 50 states

a new hard and fast rule?
4. In discussing cost, would it not be well to note .. without
,.

emphasis - that paying for counsel at the first trial stage is only one

'

element. Counsel will be required in all subsequent stages. In
addition a transcript of the evidence will have to be made, preserved
and made available to the accused. This would be quite impossible
in many misdemeanor courts in the smaller communities across the
..
,_:I'·

country, where neither recording facilities nor stenographers are
available.
I
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5. I am still tempted to include, at least in a footnote, the
SG' s suggestion that - in view of the obvious burden even his rule
would impose oo the legal profession - the requirement could be met
by using social workers and clergymen. If you have the time, take a
look at the transcript of the SG's argument. It seems to me that this
suggestion ccntradicts the basic premise that lawyers are needed.
I think the average defendant would be better off with no lawyer than
with the average social worker or clergyman - at least that would be
my own decision.
6. We have discussed Section 11 of your draft, and how you will
restructure it.
L. F. P., Jr.

